From Shame to New Name: How Naming and Shaming Creates Pro-Government Militias

LORA DI BLASI
Michigan State University

Researchers have identified naming and shaming as a strategy used by the international community to reprimand state leaders for their repressive actions. Previous research indicates that there is variation in the success of this tactic. One reason for the heterogeneity in success is that leaders with an interest in repressing opposition but avoiding international condemnation have adapted their behavior, at least partially, to avoid naming and shaming. For instance, some states choose to create and utilize alternative security apparatuses, such as pro-government militias (PGMs), to carry out these repressive acts. Creating or aligning with PGMs allows leaders to distance themselves from the execution of violence while reaping the rewards of repression. This analysis explores this dynamic. In particular, I examine how naming and shaming by Amnesty International and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights influences the creation of PGMs to skirt future international condemnation by the offending state for all states from 1986 to 2000. I find that countries are more likely to create PGMs, especially informal PGMs, after their human rights abuses have been put in the spotlight by the international community.

Introduction

States and their leaders can derive benefits from repression, including stability and the ability to maintain power. However, repression can be a costly decision for leaders due to the potential of future punishments from both the domestic and international communities (Nordas and Davenport 2013). Therefore, some leaders have incentives to find alternative, less obvious means of engaging in repression, such as dispatching other actors to carry out abuses on their behalf to avoid being punished. In this regard, this article examines how states attempt to use pro-government militias (PGMs) after being named and shamed to skirt future international condemnation. In particular, I analyze how naming and shaming efforts by Amnesty International (AI), a nongovernmental organization (NGO), and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), an intergovernmental organization (IGO), incentivizes states to create and then delegate repression to PGMs. PGMs are non-state forces that can be used to carry out repressive tasks on behalf of governments and their militaries. This strategy of outsourcing repression to maintain control allows leaders to not only gain plausible deniability but also distance from any wrongdoing. Since most leaders seek to avoid naming and shaming, a PGM is a valuable and useful tool for states that would like to use repression to maintain domestic power and order.

Nigeria provides an excellent example of this logic. In 1996, Nigeria was named and shamed by AI a total of eleven times, and the UNCHR chose not to act on allegations of human rights abuses. In 1997, they were shamed only seven times by AI, but the UNCHR passed a resolution on their human rights record. In 1998, both AI and the UNCHR ramped up their shaming of Nigeria. AI called out and publicly castigated Nigeria a total of seventeen times. The UNCHR again issued a public resolution on Nigeria’s human rights record that year. While Nigeria had experienced some naming and shaming in the past, this spike in international condemnation from multiple sources in 1998 was significantly higher than years prior. In 1999, the Bakassi Boys PGM or the Abia State Vigilante Group emerged in Nigeria. According to Human Rights Watch, the group killed hundreds of civilians through execution, mutilation, and torture and has engaged in unlawful detentions and election violence (Human Rights Watch 2002b).

The creation of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria presents a puzzle. Why would the government of Nigeria dispatch a new entity to engage in repression following naming and shaming by the international community, specifically IGOs and NGOs? I argue that this anecdote exemplifies a larger pattern. States that have already been named and shamed...
generally seek to avoid condemnation for their actions. Therefore, leaders turn to alternative security apparatuses, like PGMs, to continue repressing while evading accountability. The Bakassi Boys acted as a scapegoat for the Nigerian government to cast blame upon for human rights abuses, despite the militia being a mechanism of the state (Human Rights Watch 2002b). By distancing themselves from the PGM, the government of Nigeria was able to deny any wrongdoing and potential human rights abuses that may have occurred. This distancing and denial allowed the government to evade punishment, as human rights abuses are not technically committed by the state’s regular forces.

This analysis demonstrates that Nigeria’s use of the Bakassi Boys militia is consistent with broader, cross-national trends. Specifically, I examine whether states respond to naming and shaming from NGOs and IGOs by creating PGMs using data on the creation of and links between governments and PGMs across the globe as well as data on naming and shaming from 1986 to 2000. I argue that governments create and utilize PGMs to avoid international condemnation in the form of naming and shaming, which has previously gone underexplored (Carey and Mitchell 2012). The results show support for this argument; PGMs are more likely to be created after a state has been named and shamed by actors in the international community. More specifically, the findings demonstrate that informal PGMs with looser ties to the state are more likely to emerge after instances of international condemnation from both IGOs and NGOs. Semi-official PGMs with closer government ties, on the other hand, are only more likely to be created following instances of naming and shaming from NGOs.

This article makes several contributions to the literature. First, existing literature, particularly proponents of naming and shaming, does not consider how naming and shaming may incentivize states to employ alternative mechanisms, specifically PGMs, to continue their repressive behavior while skirting blame. This analysis advances the literature by identifying this previously unidentified consequence of naming and shaming and explaining why it occurs. Second, little is known about the reasons behind the creation of PGMs, especially beyond their relationship to violence. This analysis also contributes to this body of research by focusing on the impetus for the conception of new PGMs, which has received little attention from existing research. It is essential to understand the creation of entities like PGMs, as they play an important role in politics and repression. By understanding the creation of PGMs, the international community and human rights watch groups can pay particular attention to countries or regions that are indicative of these conditions. In addition, analyzing this previously underexplored strategy of deploying alternative agents of repression can help the international community better understand how governments use alternative agents to carry out repression against civilians. Lastly, this article highlights important implications for policymakers. Most notably, it illuminates a pathway by which state leaders cheat punishment mechanisms by IGOs and NGOs and suggests that the international community should consider alternative punishment and monitoring mechanisms for leaders suspected of human rights abuses. Overall, this article demonstrates that by highlighting the benefits of naming and shaming, scholars miss out on the role that international condemnation can play in exacerbating human rights concerns within states.

Research on Naming and Shaming

Naming and shaming is a popular and widely used practice to enforce international human rights norms and laws (Hafner-Burton 2008). Various entities, such as the United Nations, AI, and individual states, “target some nations for particular attention and condemnation in the hope that through such publicity, these governments will be pressured into changing their abusive practices” (Meenik et al. 2012, 234). It is a policy of punishment by publicity designed to inflict “reputational damage on moral grounds” (DeMeritt 2012, 598). A variety of actors can name and shame but it is mainly a tool used by NGOs, news media, and IGOs. While specific procedures vary, the basic idea is to first chastise a leader or group of leaders for their repressive acts and violations of human rights norms and laws, and then encourage them to improve their human rights practices.

Existing literature debates the effectiveness of such naming and shaming to reprimand states for human rights abuses. There are four main expectations about the relationship between naming and shaming and human rights abuses that appear to garner ample empirical support. First, some scholars expect that human rights abuses may persist despite efforts by the international community to lessen or stop the violations through naming and shaming (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton 2005; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003–2004). Violators of human rights may choose to simply ignore naming and shaming because they perceive it as cheap talk with no real consequences for their behavior or decision-making. There is ample anecdotal evidence to support this argument, such as Israel’s response to naming and shaming in recent history. The lack of effectiveness of naming and shaming may also arise from the fact that NGOs simply do not have authority over states and therefore lack a mechanism to hold leaders accountable (Hafner-Burton 2008).

Second, the argument of sanctions suggests that after being named and shamed, state leaders will make genuine efforts or attempts to improve their human rights records (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Here, violators respond positively to naming and shaming. Governments may take the criticisms seriously and reform their ways with passing legislation or holding elections (Roth 2001, 2004; Human Rights Watch 2002a; Williamson 2004). Those that consider naming and shaming a valuable tool, mainly NGOs, believe that the act of naming and shaming will negatively publicize the repressive actions and “shine a spotlight” on the abuses being committed. NGOs view naming and shaming as furthering their own causes, such as crusades against human rights abuses (Hafner-Burton 2008).

Third, some argue that naming and shaming alone is insufficient to generate any response from states (Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013; Murdie and Peksen 2013; Dietrich and Murdie 2017; Esarey and DeMeritt 2017; Peterson, Murdie, and Asal 2016). Instead, naming and shaming must be coupled with a second mechanism to encourage reform. This indicates that while reform is possible, it is conditional upon additional strategies being employed at the same time. Murdie and Davis (2012) explain that human rights NGOs can help punish human rights abusers, but only if other actors aid them. For example, naming and shaming may be more effective when coupled with pressure from a third-party state, individuals, or organizations. Condemnation may also be effective when a human rights NGO has a domestic presence within a state (Murdie and Davis 2012). Most notably, some scholars demonstrate that naming and shaming can sometimes actually lead to improvements in a
state’s human rights practices. This conclusion, however, is met with opposition because of potential unintentional reactions to naming and shaming, such as the spotlight effect (Hafner-Burton 2008).

A final argument suggests that naming and shaming can have some unintended consequences. Specifically, this argument claims that naming and shaming may actually incentivize states to ramp up abuses and carry out even more acts of repression than before they were named and shamed (Kuperman 2001; Bob 2005; Conrad and Moore 2010; Hendrix and Wong 2014; Escribia-Folch and Wright 2015). First, these instances of naming and shaming may encourage higher levels of domestic opposition, which may, in turn, threaten the repressive government (Hafner-Burton 2008). States may attempt to quell such opposition and stymie their efforts to compete for power while non-state actors may try to utilize these opportunities to “orchestrate acts of violence large enough to attract the spotlight” (Hafner-Burton 2008, 692). Although this argument highlights one potential mechanism by which naming and shaming can inadvertently increase human rights abuses, the literature has not yet considered other negative externalities that may be caused by naming and shaming, such as the creation of alternative security apparatuses like PGMs.

Since 1975, there has been an overall increase in the number of instances of naming and shaming, especially by NGOs (Hafner-Burton 2008). At the same time, an increase in the number of militias created overtime is also evident. Figure 1 displays the frequency of naming and shaming events from AI, while figure 2 displays the frequency for the UNCHR. Given the heavy reliance on this tool to curb human rights abuses, it is important to understand how effective it is at achieving its desired aims.

Figure 3 displays the number of each type of PGM in existence over time. PGMs are defined as groups that are identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government at either the national or subnational level, are armed, and have some level of organization (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013, 250). These groups are generally created or empowered by the government.

Overall, naming and shaming from AI has been increasing since the early 1990s. The number of instances of shaming from the UNCHR has dropped in more recent years; however, the decline is not substantial and appears to have evened out at the end of the sample. Therefore, in general, naming and shaming has increased in more recent decades. However, there is also an increase in the number of PGMs in existence over time, especially informal militias. Together, these figures point to a puzzling trend. If naming and shaming is an effective strategy that is increasing in frequency over time, why do we also see more security organizations delegated for repression over time? One answer may be the utility these groups provide their governments in forestalling future naming and shaming.

Although the figures above demonstrate that both naming and shaming and PGM creation have increased over time, scholars have yet to establish a link between naming and shaming and PGMs. However, this connection is important to consider since states choose to outsource abuses, given the high costs of condemnation, to alternative entities like PGMs.

**Human Rights Substitution Literature**

To avoid the costs associated with naming and shaming, leaders may turn to alternative forms of repression through a substitution method. Substitution refers to a government’s strategic replacement of “brutal methods of torture with more sophisticated techniques …” (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009, 379). As Hafner-Burton and Ron explain, when leaders face increasing pressure from human rights watch dogs, they shift toward less visible techniques (also see Ron 1997).

There is evidence of leaders substituting when considering signing on to human rights treaties. More specifically,
Vreeland (2008) explores why more repressive dictators that practice higher levels of torture are more likely to enter into human rights treaties, specifically the UN Convention Against Torture, than less repressive dictatorships. In addition, Payne and Abouharb (2016) identify a similar finding with the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights. They find leaders who want to repress but also seek to avoid the costs of accountability will be less reliant on extrajudicial killings and instead prioritize forced disappearances. This literature makes clear that dictators do strategically substitute one form of human rights violations for others.

This substitution argument can also be applied to naming and shaming. When leaders are punished and scrutinized by the international community, especially human rights watch groups, IGOs, and NGOs, they will attempt to substitute their repressive tactics for those that may engender less scrutiny. The literature has shown this substitution technique at work when states delegate violence to paramilitary groups (Brenner and Campbell 2000). I argue PGMs are another example of this substitution method by leaders. However, instead of substituting one form of human rights abuses for another, states will substitute PGMs for their normal security forces, such as the military. Therefore, states...
delegate repression to PGMs to decrease their own expected costs. This delegation highlights another example of unintended consequences of naming and shaming by the international community, which has been underexplored. The remainder of this article will focus on this relationship.

### Pro-Government Militias and Plausible Deniability

**Cost–Benefit Calculations for Repression**

It is assumed that leaders prioritize their political survival (Nordås and Davenport 2013). However, at times, they may face threats to their tenure and power from competitors. As a result, some leaders consider extreme policy actions, namely human rights abuses, to counter or eliminate such threats. Scholars suggest that leaders make cost–benefit calculations regarding the use of repression when faced with dissent from their citizens (Nordås and Davenport 2013). When the benefits of repression to quiet dissent and maintain political office outweigh the costs, some leaders will choose to repress (Valentino 2004; Krain 2012; Nordås and Davenport 2013).

The main benefit of repression for leaders is maintaining their hold on power. Governments may choose to utilize repression in various forms, including censorship, political restrictions, terror, and violence. Leaders expect these actions to neutralize political opponents and increase the costs for the opposition such that it is no longer a feasible strategy (Davenport 1995). Such a strategy limits how successful dissent may be and can offer more security for the leadership. The use of repression may also deter future opposition (Pierskalla 2010).

Repression can also be risky, as leaders face the possibility of future punishment in response to their actions. Punishments can include sanctions, fewer trade partners, reduced international aid, and reduced foreign investment (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton 2005). In addition, states may face reputational costs (Risse and Ropp 1999). Finally, states may also be named and shamed by the international community in response to repression. These last two consequences are important because leaders generally care about their identity in the international system and want to maintain or improve their status as legitimate regimes (Murdie and Davis 2012).

Naming and shaming by the international community is intended to alter the cost–benefit calculation for those trying to decide whether to repress their citizens by increasing the costs for leaders who abuse human rights. By drawing the international community’s attention to abuses, naming and shaming shines a spotlight on a state’s repressive actions. Naming and shaming may also serve as a catalyst for future punishments. Therefore, naming and shaming can create a challenge for leaders; they may want to repress to ensure their political survival, but they also want to lower the costs associated with committing human rights abuses (Kirschke 2000; Roessler 2005).

Some states are sensitive to the costs of punishments like naming and shaming, as demonstrated by the case of President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya. In 1991, President Moi was named and shamed by the United States and a dozen other aid-donor nations for political repression throughout Kenya. Kenya was mandated to introduce political and economic reforms and improvements in human rights or lose their economic aid within six months (Greenhouse 1991). In response to this naming and shaming coupled with a threat of loss of funding, President Moi embraced political reform within one month. The government lifted a ban on opposition political parties, legalized multipartyism, and eventually held its first multiparty election since 1966 (Roessler 2005, 213–14).

After being named and shamed, many states will be eager to avoid being chastised publicly again, as was the case in Kenya. However, not all leaders will want to end their spell of repression. An alternative solution is for states to create a separate apparatus to carry out acts of repression on its behalf, such as a PGM. Instead of making genuine efforts to reform their human rights practices in their country, states may instead opt to delegate violence to PGMs to escape the responsibility of subsequent human rights abuses.

Since leaders generally do not engage in repression first-hand, they must outsource the task to other groups, such as militias (Gurr 1986). Creating a PGM after being named and shamed allows a state to continue carrying out repressive actions but under a new institution that is separate from their recognized security forces. As Mitchell, Carey, and Butler explain, “The presence of these groups permits governments to shift responsibility for the consequences of the use of violence” (2014, 19). Therefore, PGMs act as a solution to unfavorable costs of repression for leaders, as the cost of repression is potentially diminished for state leaders because they no longer face scrutiny. The case of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria demonstrates this point.

When PGMs carry out human rights abuses, governments can evade accountability by placing blame on PGMs for acts of repression while still achieving their goals (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). Essentially, the PGM presents a scapegoat that can afford state leaders plausible deniability due to the PGM’s weak ties to the government. Therefore, states have institutions to create and employ PGMs after being named and shamed in anticipation of future international scrutiny. As a result, when governments cooperate with or utilize PGMs, human rights will suffer (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). Although Kenya chose to stop their repressive behavior in response to naming and shaming, not all states will. Other states, such as Iran in the early to mid-1990s, have responded to naming and shaming by shifting the responsibility for repression away from themselves and toward a PGM. In the half-decade leading up to the creation of the Ansar-e Hezbollah PGM in Iran in 1995, the government of Iran was named and shamed a total of sixty-eight times by AI and was continually the focus of public resolutions from the UNCHR. Amid immense international condemnation, the Ansar-e Hezbollah group was created in 1995 as an informal PGM. Their main targets were unarmed political opposition, government critics, and journalists (Mitchell and Carey 2013).

The group has been accused of numerous human rights abuses, including assault and intimidation of writers and intellectuals, disruption of gatherings of critical government policies, and carrying out violent raids on offices of magazines and newspapers with which they disagreed (Amnesty International 1997). Furthermore, there is evidence of corroboration with police in some instances, indicating some support from the government and their normal security forces. For example, in 1999 following a demonstration by several hundred students in response to the government’s closure of a reformist newspaper, police allowed members of the Ansar-e Hezbollah PGM into a student dormitory to attack and detain some of the students (Maloney 2013). They “systematically ransacked student rooms, destroyed property and assaulted students … 300 students were wounded, 400 taken into detention and four were killed” (Megally 1999). When students held a rally to protest the initial assault, the
PGM again attacked students “with sticks and chains while the police reportedly stood by or joined in the attacks” (Megally 1999).

Despite approval and even collusion in multiple instances, the Minister of the Interior, Hojatoleslam Abdolvahed Mousavi-Lari, stated that the assault on campus took place without the ministry’s approval and denied any involvement (Megally 1999). In addition, President Khatami commented that the PGM “instigators should be lawfully prosecuted for what they had done in response to the ‘ugly acts’ of student protests” (Sadeghi 2009). Even Ayatollah Khamenei condemned the PGM to presumably distance the government from the militia by stating, “Entering students’ bedrooms by force is like attacking homes and private residences unlawfully, in the worst cases at night … If, for example, [the students] insulted the leader, we have to be patient, to be reticent, even if they set my picture on fire, or tear it” (Gorgin 2008). Iran provides an example of an attempt to shift the blame for human rights abuses and repression away from themselves and onto groups, like the Ansar-e Hezbollah PGM. Since PGMs are not official security forces, states are often able to deny culpability in the abuses the groups commit, regardless of its tacit approval or support.

Unique Benefits of PGMs
As demonstrated by the case of Ansar-e Hezbollah, PGMs provide several benefits to their respective states that explain why leaders turn to these alternative security apparatuses. First, they reduce the political cost of repression for leadership. By definition, PGMs are outside the state security apparatus. They cannot be officially tied to the state, allowing them to skirt blame for abuses committed by the militia, even if on behalf of the government. These informal ties between PGMs and governments create distance between the two units and afford the government plausible deniability. As Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe explain, these militias can help governments “to evade accountability for strategically useful violence” (2013, 250). Essentially, these militias create space between the regime and the repression they want to be carried out on their behalf because the militia is not a part of their standing security apparatus. Leaders can deny loose links to these groups while still benefitting from their repressive actions.

Second, PGMs offer logistical incentives for states (Staniland 2012; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). They increase force numbers, lower deployment costs, and can provide informational advantages in their home regions. Most argue that militias can offer strategic benefits to governments in times of conflict that they may not be able to achieve otherwise (Eck 2015). However, PGMs can also be costly for governments. Especially when ties between the group and the state are unofficial, governments may lose their monopoly on violence when they delegate to militias (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). This suggests that the strength of the link between the state and the PGM may determine the types of benefits leaders can derive from their use.

Types of PGMs
The literature generally separates PGMs into two categories: informal and semi-official (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2015). The main distinction between these two classifications is how formally acknowledged the link is between the government and the PGM. According to the Pro-Government Militia Database (PGMD), informal PGMs are described as pro-government, government-backed, or government-allied. They may also be armed or trained by the government. The critical identification characteristic of these groups is that the link to these PGMs is not formally or officially acknowledged. Examples of informal PGMs include death squads and the Young Patriots in Cote d’Ivoire (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013).

The Janjaweed militia in Sudan is another example of a government’s use of an informal PGM to carry out human rights abuses. The Janjaweed is a brutal militia that continuously carries out violence against the local population. The government of Sudan responded to the issues with rebels in Darfur by creating the group (Human Rights Watch 2005). According to a Human Rights Watch Report, “The Sudanese government’s recruitment and deployment of militia forces, and its strategy of targeting civilians from specific ethnic groups to combat the rebel insurgency resulted in crimes against humanity and war crimes” (Human Rights Watch 2005, 6). The government has not only funded and supported the militia but also directly encouraged the Janjaweed to carry out human rights abuses. The Human Rights Watch Report cites the attacks on Wadi Saleh, a province in Sudan, as an example of this. In response to the Fur joining the rebellion, the state minister of the interior, Ahmed Haroun, called on the Janjaweed militia to “kill the Fur.” Following this call for action, the Janjaweed army, along with the military, killed members of the ethnic group and looted their property (Human Rights Watch 2005). The Janjaweed militia demonstrates how PGMs can carry out abuses on behalf of the government, and how this creates a rationale for why governments create and support PGMs. Therefore, after funding, support, and direction from the state officials, the militia was able to carry out human rights abuses on behalf of the government.

While informal PGMs are created without strict ties to the states, semi-official PGMs have a formally and/or legally acknowledged connection to the government. The PGMD explains that “a semi-official PGM might be subordinate to the regular security forces, but is separate from the regular police and security forces. As such, the link between the PGM and the government is more formal and institutionalized…” (Mitchell and Carey 2013, 10). Examples of semi-official PGMs include the Arrow Boys in Uganda, Saddam’s Lion Cubs in Iraq, and the Revolutionary Guard in Iran. These types of PGMs, while not able to afford the government as much plausible deniability as informal PGMs, are still able to provide some cover for repressive actions. Their close ties to the government make it more challenging to carry out acts of violence on their behalf, and therefore, they may be less able to assist the government. However, as seen in the case of the Bakassi Boys, governments gain plausible deniability with these types of PGMs by denying specific actions of the group and their knowledge of any abuses.

Distance
Due to the nature of informal militias and their links to their respective states, the distance between the state and the PGM is greater for these groups compared to the distance between semi-official PGMs and states. Informal PGMs are created with loose ties that are difficult to define and identify, allowing the government more plausible deniability than semi-official PGMs (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013; Rudbeck, Mukherjee, and Nelson 2016).2 Although their

2PGMs are created for a variety of purposes and can serve multiple purposes to its respective government (Carey and Mitchell 2017). Furthermore, PGMs may
connection to the government may be well known within a country, the group has no formalized link to the government or might be denied by the state (Alvarez 2006; Carey and Mitchell 2017). Essentially, it is more difficult to associate informal PGMs with their governments than semi-official PGMs, affording more cover for governments. The relationship between the government and an informal PGM may be entirely denied by a government, unofficial, or simply clandestine. Therefore, their relationship is not always observable by the public or those outside the state (Carey and Mitchell 2017). This makes pinpointing blame and responsibility for human rights abuses much more difficult for the international community. Even if a loose connection is detected by the international community, the leader can exploit their principal-agent relationship to the leader’s advantage. They can simply blame those specific actions of abuse on rogue agents and argue that the group is out of their control (Kirschke 2000; Alvarez 2006; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015; Rudbeck, Mukherjee, and Nelson 2016; Carey and Mitchell 2017).

One example of this would be Serbia’s use of the Arkan Tigers, an informal PGM. Officials, such as Slobodan Milošević, were able to avoid international accountability for the group, despite “the flimsy basis for denial” (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). When exploring these abuses, the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia found evidence that while Serbian officials had connections to this group, “it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Stanišić or Simatović planned or ordered the crimes” (UN ICTY 2013). They were then acquitted on all charges.

This leads to my first hypothesis:

**H1:** States are likely to create informal PGMs following naming and shaming by the international community.

While the literature has distinguished between the two types of militias for various purposes, there is still reason to believe that semi-official militias will also be created following instances of naming and shaming. Semi-official PGMs can also provide some plausible deniability and shelter from the retribution of repressive actions for governments and their leaders. This function is mainly because they are a separate apparatus and not formally part of any official military or police entities, providing some distance between the leader and the group. Despite providing some limited plausible deniability for leaders, using semi-official PGMs should still be preferable than using the military for repression. This is because, in addition to providing some plausible deniability, PGMs also require fewer start-up costs. Therefore, some states may be inclined to use them, if only sparingly. Furthermore, the nature of the military-government link resembles a principal-agent relationship, allowing the government to essentially claim the group cannot be controlled or is a rogue entity (Carey and Mitchell 2017; Hibbs 1973; Tilly 1978). As seen in the case of the Bakassi Boys, governments gain plausible deniability with these types of PGMs by denying specific actions of the group and their knowledge of any abuses. This leads to my second hypothesis:

**H2:** States are likely to create semi-official PGMs following naming and shaming by the international community.

In this analysis, I argue that PGMs are, in fact, mechanisms for plausible deniability. Evidence from the cases of Iran and the Bakassi Boys exemplifies exactly how leaders use PGMs to distance themselves from the repression. Furthermore, arguments for the force multiplier effect of PGMs are shaped by the narrative and context of civil war, which ignores the pre- and post-conflict settings, along with times where conflict may fall short of technical qualifiers of civil war. By extending beyond the context of civil wars, we can better understand how PGMs operate and may be used differently from the military.

**Research Design**

To test the hypotheses set forth above, I analyze the effects of naming and shaming in two main models. I examine the effects of naming and shaming on the creation of informal PGMs and semi-official PGMs separately. The dependent variables come from the PGMD by Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013). The dependent variables are dichotomous indicators with a value of 1 if at least one PGM of a given type was created in a given year and zero otherwise. Almost 3 percent of the observations are years where informal PGMs were created, and almost 2 percent are years semi-official PGMs were created. The measures only capture the creation of new PGMs in a year according to the PGMD and do not account for existing PGMs. There are 151 informal PGMs, and 59 semi-official PGMs created across 145 countries in the analyses. These data cover a global sample for the period of 1986 through 2000, and the unit of analysis for all models is the country-year. Both main models have 2,711 observations.

The two main explanatory variables for this analysis capture two sources of naming and shaming by NGOs and IGOs. I use data from both the UNCHR and AI to create two classifications of naming and shaming as naming and shaming can come from a variety of sources. In addition, IGOs and NGOs can both engage in naming and shaming to varying effects. First, for UNCHR naming and shaming, I use data from Lebovic and Voeten (2006) to capture a response or action that limited plausible deniability for leaders, using semi-official PGMs should still be preferable than using the military for repression. This is because, in addition to providing some plausible deniability, PGMs also require fewer start-up costs. Therefore, some states may be inclined to use them, if only sparingly. Furthermore, the nature of the military-government link resembles a principal-agent relationship, allowing the government to essentially claim the group cannot be controlled or is a rogue entity (Carey and Mitchell 2017; Hibbs 1973; Tilly 1978). As seen in the case of the Bakassi Boys, governments gain plausible deniability with these types of PGMs by denying specific actions of the group and their knowledge of any abuses. This leads to my second hypothesis:

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4 In this situation, the state would be the principal, and the PGM would be the self-interested agent that it hires or employs. The state needs to hire or create the PGM to carry out tasks that it cannot do itself, due to lack of skill and opportunity, or in this case avoid having the normal standing military forces involved. The key to this relationship is delegation of a task, and specifically in the case of PGMS, it is the delegation of repression. In this relationship, the principal is distanced from the agent and is assumed to be the direction-giver and supervisor. They make the rules and delegate the tasks for the agent to carry out. It is important to note that the principal cannot directly observe the actions of the principal at all times. Traditionally, the principal-agent model presents the issue of asymmetrical information possessed by the agent as a disadvantage for the principal. In most cases, this issue creates tension between the parties and further problems. However, in the case of PGMS and the governments they represent, it is evident that this distancing of the two parties and the “turning a blind-eye” approach used by governments is actually a benefit for both parties.

5 Due to the nature of both dependent variables having an overwhelming majority of observations of zeros, I re-estimate the main models as rare events logistic regressions as a robustness check. The results are consistent with the main models and do not change the findings of the analyses. Results can be found in Section A2 of the online appendix.

6 Section A1 of the online appendix displays a test for multicollinearity of the naming and shaming indicators that shows that none of the variables are correlated enough to introduce any bias into the analyses.
by the UNCHR. The original measure is constructed using five ordered categories, indicating increasingly severe responses by the UNCHR to human rights violations. The first level takes on a value of zero when a state is not named and shamed by the UNCHR. The second level reflects when a state is a target of UNCHR discussion, but the Commission does not take any action against the state. This can happen when a resolution fails or motion not to consider the resolution passes. The third level indicates that the UNCHR has continued consideration of action under confidential sessions, which means that the unreleased allegations are deemed to have merit. The fourth level demonstrates that the UNCHR issued an advisory or critical statement. This is a milder sanction and comes from the chair of the Commission. Lastly, the fifth level indicates that the UNCHR issued a public resolution on a state’s human rights record, which is the most severe response given by the UNCHR.

To distinguish public naming and shaming by the UNCHR from less visible or more temperate efforts by the body, I collapse Lebovic and Voeten’s original measure to construct a three-level ordinal indicator. In this new coding, a value of zero indicates there was no claim against that state for a given year (level 1 of the original variable). The variable is equal to 1 when the UNCHR shaming remains at a low level and is not made public (levels 2–4 of the original variable). Though these represent cases where a state’s human rights record was brought into question, and the IGO found enough merit to internally respond to the accusation, the UNCHR ultimately chose to take no further public actions. Finally, the variable equals 2 when the UNCHR issues a public resolution on a state’s human rights record (level 5 of the original variable). This distinction between public and private actions by the UNCHR is important because states are most likely to make alterations to their behavior in response to public chastisement that may spur further penalties. Instances where no public action is taken or where allegations are dismissed are less likely to influence a state’s decision to delegate violence to PGMs.

Second, I use data on NGO human rights reporting from Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005), which provides two measures of shaming from AI. The first indicator measures the number of AI’s background reports, which are sent to human rights professionals, United Nations officials, academics, and feature journalists regarding the state’s human rights practices. The second measure the number of AI press releases, which are generally shorter and aimed at the general public and non-specialized media. By employing the NGO data, I can discern whether states respond equally to naming and shaming efforts by IGOs and NGOs.

For my analyses, I use the same coding scheme as the UNCHR variable to construct an ordinal variable of AI shaming severity levels. This new variable is equal to 1 when AI issues at least one background report on a state. This lower level response is less public and will not be circulated as widely in the international community. The variable is equal to 2 when AI issues at least one press release on a state, indicating a more public response that will be seen by more of the international community. Lastly, the variable is equal to zero when there is no shaming from AI.

I follow the model specification from Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell (2015) to identify covariates that may explain PGM creation. To account for the incentive and ability to avoid domestic accountability with political institutions, I create three dichotomous indicators for regime type using the Polity2 indicator (Marshall, Gurr, and Kaggers 2016). First, I create a dichotomous indicator for strong autocracies, which are coded as countries that score –7 or lower on the Polity2 scale. I then code weak democracies as countries that score between 1 and 6 on the Polity2 scale. Third, I code strong democracies as countries that score 7 or above on the Polity2 scale. The omitted category is weak autocracies.

To measure international sensitivity, I use Carey et al.’s measure for aid dependence. To construct this measure, I use the purchasing-price parity adjusted value of aid sent from democracies (those coded at least 7 on the Polity2 scale) to any recipient. I then take the natural log of the sum total of aid received from democracies as a proportion of the recipient’s gross domestic product (GDP) to create the final measure for democratic aid dependence. I also use the distance in kilometers between each country and the nearest democracy as a measure for monitoring costs for the international community. In addition, I include a measure of autocratic aid dependence.

In order to capture the effect of state disorder on PGM creation, I use data from the Cross-National Times Series data (Banks 2008) to code dichotomous indicators for the presence of strikes, riots, demonstrations, and guerrilla attacks. I control for civil violence and civil war with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Civil violence measures armed conflict above the 25 battle-related deaths within one-year threshold and civil war captures more than 1,000 battle-related deaths. As Carey et al. explain, using both indicators of civil conflict allows us to better understand how the varying nature and magnitude of civil conflict can explain PGM creation within the disorder framework.

I control for economic development with the log of real GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables. I also control for the logged population from the Correlates of War data (Singer 1987). Lastly, I use Fearon and Latin’s (2003) measure for ethnic fractionalization to measure whether ethnically heterogeneous states are more likely to experience PGM creation.

Table 1 displays the summary statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables.

Methods

To test my hypotheses, I use two models to analyze each of the two PGM creation dependent variables, which are displayed in table 2. Model 1 examines the effects of shaming on informal PGM creation, while Model 2 analyzes the effects of shaming on semi-official PGM creation. Both models use logistic regression as the dependent variables are dichotomous. I cluster standard errors on the country to account for non-independence of observations for the same country over time. Lastly, I lag all covariates and control variables by one year to examine the effects of PGM creation in the year following naming and shaming.

Results

Overall, the results demonstrate support for both hypotheses regarding PGM creation following instances of naming and shaming. Informal PGMs are created after shaming by both the UNCHR and AI. States also respond to

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6 The results remain consistent when Lebovic and Voeten’s five-point scale is used as an alternative. However, due to space limitations, the full tables for these results are not shown.

7 Section A1 of the online appendix displays a correlation table for the two main independent variables to demonstrate that there is no issue of multicollinearity.

8 Both models produced the same results without clustered standard errors.
Table 1. Summary statistics for main dependent and explanatory variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Minimum value</th>
<th>Maximum value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal PGMs (dichotomous)</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-official PGMs (dichotomous)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI shaming (ordinal)</td>
<td>1.538</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHR shaming (ordinal)</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Logistic regression models: examining the effects of naming and shaming on PGM creation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1: informal PGMs</th>
<th>Model 2: semi-official PGMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef. (SE)</td>
<td>Coef. (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHR shaming (ordinal)</td>
<td>0.487*** (0.162)</td>
<td>0.453** (0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI shaming (ordinal)</td>
<td>0.357* (0.209)</td>
<td>0.236 (0.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong autocracy</td>
<td>0.290 (0.314)</td>
<td>0.287 (0.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak democracy</td>
<td>0.672** (0.314)</td>
<td>0.220 (0.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong democracy</td>
<td>0.016 (0.595)</td>
<td>0.080 (0.862)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic aid dep.</td>
<td>0.139** (0.063)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to democracy</td>
<td>0.133 (0.167)</td>
<td>0.122 (0.239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic aid dep.</td>
<td>-0.085 (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.032 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>-0.548** (0.272)</td>
<td>-0.322 (0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>0.691* (0.308)</td>
<td>0.813** (0.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>0.467 (0.323)</td>
<td>-0.160 (0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerilla attacks</td>
<td>0.388 (0.284)</td>
<td>0.309 (0.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil violence</td>
<td>0.799** (0.309)</td>
<td>0.755* (0.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>0.087 (0.457)</td>
<td>0.171 (0.444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-0.471** (0.195)</td>
<td>0.042 (0.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population</td>
<td>0.109 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.309** (0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.624 (0.485)</td>
<td>1.542** (0.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.506** (2.029)</td>
<td>-9.908*** (2.766)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>2,711</td>
<td>2,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>721.485</td>
<td>463.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>827.777</td>
<td>570.283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Model 1 estimates the effects of NGO and IGO naming and shaming on the creation of informal PGMs. The coefficient for shaming from the UNCHR is positive and significant. Similarly, the coefficient for AI shaming is also positive and significant. Therefore, the findings indicate that informal PGMs with looser ties to the government are created after states are named and shamed by the UNCHR and AI. These findings demonstrate strong support for Hypothesis 1.

Figure 4 displays the first differences from Model 1, which are the changes in the probability of informal PGM creation as the shaming variables increase from their lowest to highest values. The first differences provide information on the substantive impact of the relationship between naming and shaming and informal PGM creation. The graph shows that both sources of shaming have significant effects on the predicted probability of informal PGM creation, with AI shaming having a slightly larger substantive effect. States that experience no shaming from the UNCHR have a 1.13 percent chance of creating informal PGMs; however, states that experience the highest level of UNCHR shaming with a public resolution have a 2.95 percent chance of informal PGM creation, indicating a 161 percent increase in probability. Similarly, states without any shaming from AI have a 0.55 percent chance of informal PGM creation, but states with the most public AI shaming of press releases have a 1.58 percent chance of informal PGM creation, meaning a 187 percent substantive change. These findings demonstrate substantial impacts of shaming on the likelihood of informal PGM creation.

Model 2 analyzes the creation of semi-official PGMs. The coefficient for shaming from the UNCHR is positive and significant, indicating that after the UNCHR shames a state, they are more likely to create a semi-official PGM. While the coefficient for AI shaming is also positive, it fails to achieve statistical significance and conventional levels. These findings demonstrate conditional support for Hypothesis 2.

Shaming from the UNCHR appears to have a more powerful effect on states than AI’s shaming when considering semi-official PGM creation. While neither source can directly punish a state for a poor human rights record, the
UNCHR has the ability to influence member states and increase the likelihood of future punishment. For instance, a public resolution issued by the UNCHR may bring future economic sanctions, military intervention, or reduced amounts of foreign aid for the shamed state. UN member states may be persuaded by the IGOs’ investigation and findings, and more democratic states may face backlash from their own domestic constituents for supporting repressive regimes.

While shaming from AI can bring an issue to light and showcase a state’s poor respect for human rights, it does not appear to induce the same response from states considering semi-official PGM creation. Although AI shaming may constitute preliminary reports that IGOs like the UNCHR, states, and criminal courts use to begin or further their own investigations, AI is unable to take action on its own based on the findings in its reports. Therefore, AI shaming may be considered less threatening to leaders, especially in the short term.

Furthermore, the nature of semi-official PGMs may also explain this finding. While not official security apparatuses, these militias are more closely tied to states and their leaders than informal PGMs. It would be more difficult for a leader to claim the group is a rogue entity. Thus, the use of such agents may not afford the state much plausible deniability for their actions. Since a lack of plausible deniability may suggest a higher likelihood that abuses will be traced back to the state, leaders may be unwilling to utilize these semi-official militias when the circumstances are not dire. Counterintuitively, the threat of AI punishment may not spur a state to take on added risks, while UNCHR condemnation may. As previously mentioned, AI can inflict no direct punishment on the states it shames. With UNCHR shaming, however, future condemnation from member states may carry with it a significant cost inspiring states to adopt riskier behaviors to avoid it.

Despite the disadvantages posted by the closer link between semi-official PGMs and the state, there are also clear benefits for leaders contemplating using them. Some states may find a semi-official PGM to be more palatable as they are more easily controlled and may help leaders avoid principal-agent problems. This effectively allows the state to control the level and targets of violence, which may also allow states to effectively deflect attention away from the state. Closer ties may also facilitate synergies with other forces, such as the military, which may bolster their effectiveness and provide leaders with additional oversight. Thus, some states may still find closely linked militias valuable. This may explain the finding that only UNCHR shaming induces the creation of semi-official PGMs. These findings highlight different strategic logics for the use of these militias.

The control variables offer a few additional important insights into PGM creation. Weak democracies and increasing levels of democratic aid are associated with informal PGM creation. This finding is consistent with the findings from Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell (2015). In addition, civil violence also increases the likelihood of informal PGM creation. GDP has a negative effect on informal PGM creation, meaning that as states become wealthier, they are less likely to create informal militias. Strikes also have a negative effect on the likelihood of informal PGM creation. Similar to informal PGMs, civil violence is significant for Model 2 exploring the creation of semi-official PGMs. In addition, as the population increases, states are more likely to adopt these militias. Lastly, more heterogeneous states and states experiencing riots are more likely to create semi-official PGMs.

Naming and Shaming and Repression after PGM Creation

The findings demonstrate that leaders are strategic in their response to naming and shaming. In an attempt to avoid future instances of condemnations, leaders outsource their repression to alternative security apparatuses. However, understanding whether this strategy is actually effective for leaders is essential.

Preliminary evidence demonstrates that this strategy can be an effective tool for leaders to avoid future condemnation. Of the states that create a PGM following high levels of AI shaming, meaning press releases issued on their human rights record, only 4.01 percent of those states were then shamed again the following year by both AI and the UNCHR. On the other hand, states that do not create a PGM following high levels of shaming by the UNCHR, meaning continued consideration or a public resolution, only 10.89 percent were then shamed again by both sources the following year. Again, states that do not create a militia following intense UNCHR shaming are twice as likely to be shamed again in the future by both sources compared to states that do create these militias. These findings demonstrate that creating PGMs can be a beneficial strategy for leaders hoping to avoid future condemnation as they tend to be shamed less in the future as compared to states with similar levels of shaming that do not create these militias.

In addition, evidence also demonstrates that levels of repression will worsen or remain the same after the creation of PGMs in response to naming and shaming. According to the Cingranelli–Richards Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI), of the states that create informal PGMs after shaming by AI, 333 of the 372 cases, or just over 89 percent, will have the same or worse levels of repression the following year (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The same is true for 300 of the 320 cases for semi-official PGM creation after AI shaming or just over 93 percent of the cases. In comparison, just over 78 percent of states that do not create either type of PGM following shaming by AI will have worse or similar human rights conditions the following year. This indicates that states that do not create militias will be more likely to see improvements in human rights conditions over time. The results for the UNCHR present a similar pattern, but with fewer cases as UNCHR shaming happens less often than AI shaming. Of the countries that create informal PGMs after UNCHR shaming, twenty-four of the forty-five cases, or just over 53 percent, will also have the same or worse human rights conditions. Of the twenty-two cases for semi-official PGMs, fourteen cases, or just over 63 percent, will have the same or worse human rights conditions after the PGM is created. These same patterns also hold when exploring repression using other measures, such as the Political Terror Scale (PTS), which captures political violence and terror in a state with a five-level terror scale (Gibney et al. 2019). These findings demonstrate that leaders are able to continue repressing at either the same or more intense levels after the creation of the PGM in response to naming and shaming.

The case of the Bakassi Boys presented earlier demonstrates how the decision to utilize PGMs after being named and shamed can be an effective tool to avoid future instances of naming and shaming while still carrying out repression. In Nigeria, shaming reached a maximum value in 1998, from both AI and the UNCHR. The following year, the PGM was created and the rates at which Nigeria was
shamed quickly dropped. In 1999, the government was only shamed by AI at a total of four times, and they were still shamed by the UNCHR. The following year, in 2000, the country was shamed a total of eight times, which is an increase from 1999, but still less than half the number of instances from before the PGM existed. While AI shaming data do not extend beyond 2000, UNCHR shaming significantly dropped in 2001 and 2002 with no instances of shaming from the Commission. Overall, this demonstrates a significant decrease in shaming following the use of a PGM by the state.

The government of Nigeria also continued to repress after the creation of the Bakassi Boys according to the physical integrity rights index from CIRI and the PTS. The CIRI index ranges from 0 to 8, with higher levels indicating more government respect for human rights. The year before the PGM was created, Nigeria’s government respect of human rights was a score of 4, indicating some respect for human rights. The score dropped to a value of 2 the year the PGM was created, then dropped to a value of 1 the year after the PGM was created, and finally returned to a score of 2 when the PGM had existed for two years. This demonstrates a significant decrease in government respect for human rights once the PGM was created, which was maintained for several years.

Overall, the PTS score for Nigeria remained generally constant throughout this period. There was a slight improvement in human rights conditions the year after the PGM was created; however, it returned to the previous level the following year. Together, these two measures of state repression indicate that government respect for human rights worsened after the creation of the PGM and remained at those lower levels, and overall political terror in the country remained fairly constant after the creation of the PGM. Future work should more thoroughly investigate this relationship to better understand in what ways PGMs can act as a scapegoat for leaders to avoid future international condemnation.

Conclusions and Future Work

The analyses show that when states are named and shamed by AI, they are more likely to create only informal PGMs. However, when named and shamed by the UNCHR, states are more likely to create both types of militias. The results generally demonstrate support of the hypotheses, especially Hypothesis 1, that naming and shaming can instigate the creation of informal PGMs. Furthermore, preliminary evidence demonstrates that this strategy of using PGMs to avoid future condemnation does work for leaders and can be beneficial for their international reputation. In addition, this strategy of creating PGMs also allows leaders to continue violence and abusing human rights within their state, demonstrating a common utility of PGMs for governments.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, naming and shaming is intended to curb human rights abuses by repressive leaders and encourage reform. However, this analysis demonstrates that PGMs are sometimes an unintended consequence of naming and shaming, which highlights a major weakness of this strategy. Instead of improving human rights practices as the naming and shaming actions intend for them to, leaders are able to employ alternative apparatuses to continue carrying out abuses while absolving themselves of blame and the potential costs associated with naming and shaming. This mechanism that is traditionally utilized to improve human rights practices may actually create perverse incentives for leaders to simply be more creative in their attempts to continue abusing their citizens.

However, liberal ideas regarding world order depend upon international actions like naming and shaming to effectively reprimand other actors for human rights abuses. If the international community is unable to achieve its goals through means such as naming and shaming, as this analysis indicates, more attention should be given to alternatives. These alternatives may extend beyond simply naming and shaming leaders who create PGMs to also include reductions in foreign aid, economic sanctions, or other forms of punishment. Additionally, it would be beneficial to further explore how states can cheat in order to avoid international attention. In the future, analyzing other forms of international punishment, such as the effects of sanctions or military intervention, may provide more insight into how and when leaders decide to deploy alternative security apparatuses as scapegoats for repression.

Second, in addition to identifying and analyzing an additional unexplored consequence of naming and shaming, these findings also provide an explanation for when leaders create PGMs. Although some research explains the relationship between PGMs and violence, previous literature has not yet fully been able to identify what leads to and triggers the creation of both types of militias. A better understanding of the conditions that lead governments to create PGMs can allow the international community, especially IGOs and NGOs, to address this phenomenon.

In order to address these concerns and conclusions, it is imperative that the entirety of a state’s repressive apparatuses is reflected in our analyses and in policy decisions. This would include PGMs but also other national and sub-national actors that the government may employ for violence. By excluding certain actors or groups, like PGMs, we may underestimate the ability and capacity for certain states to repress. In addition, it is important to better understand not only when these groups influence repression, but in what ways. Some work has begun to explore the link between PGMs, especially informal militias, and human rights abuses; however, the mechanisms by which these groups repress have gone largely underexplored.

In terms of policy implications, IGOs and NGOs should be aware of and now anticipate this previously unidentified unintended consequence of naming and shaming by leaders. This study finds that leaders are turning to alternative security apparatuses once already condemned, and therefore trying to cheat to avoid future accountability. However, before naming and shaming states, IGOs and NGOs could proactively monitor human rights conditions in these states, especially those with a known history of militia violence. Monitoring efforts could also be enhanced by further collaboration and information sharing between monitoring organizations and domestic NGOs, as suggested by Murdie and Davis (2012).

Second, IGOs and NGOs considering shaming states could call upon specific members of the international community for assistance, notably foreign aid donor states. Previous literature has found that recipients of financial aid from democracies are more likely to create and align with informal militias (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). Therefore, asking donor states to reconsider their type or amount of foreign aid to states known to be engaging with militias could prove an effective tool for stymying PGM creation and collaboration.

Although these findings show that states create PGMs after being named and shamed, only preliminary empirical work has been done to examine what happens to a state’s
human rights record after they begin employing these militias. Future work might systematically explore the impact that this chain of events has on human rights: How well and in what ways does this strategy work for leaders and how? How and which types of human rights get worse after PGMs are created in response to naming and shaming? Additionally, it would be interesting to examine how the human rights community responds after PGMs are created. Essentially, do international actors have a learning curve for picking up on things like the use of informal PGMs for repression? Further exploration of state behavior following naming and shaming can shed light on these issues.

The implications for this work extend beyond simply concluding that naming and shaming has unintended consequences. We must understand that governments may have alternative apparatuses loosely tied to the state, but nonetheless under their authority and control that can carry out repression on their behalf. These also include actors outside of the official channels. In addition to issues of measurement and conceptual gaps, the larger issue at hand is the fact that current practices to curb human rights abuses, such as naming and shaming, are sometimes failing to discourage the creation of groups like PGMs. The issues of repressive mechanisms, such as PGMs, have largely escaped academic literature and policy agendas until this point; however, the issue now becomes how to address these groups and their leaders.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Jakana Thomas for her advice and invaluable comments on many previous versions of this article. I also thank Michael Colaresi, Benjamin Appel, the editors at International Studies Quarterly, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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